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Abstract
Mistakes that affect others often are linked to increased feelings of responsibility and guilt. This especially holds for individuals
high in obsessive-compulsive symptoms (OCS), who are characterized by inflated feelings of responsibility and a fear of causing
harm to others. This event-related potential study investigated individual differences in OCS in social performance monitoring
with a focus on the role of responsibility for other’s harm and the error-related negativity (ERN). Healthy volunteers low (N = 27)
or high (N = 24) in OCS performed a Flanker task in the presence of a gender-matched peer in three conditions. Mistakes could
either have negative monetary consequences for 1) oneself, 2) the other, or 3) no one. Results showed enhanced ERNs for
mistakes that harmed others instead of the self for individuals high in OCS, whereas individuals low in OCS showed decreased
amplitudes specifically for mistakes affecting no one versus oneself. Amplitudes of the error positivity but not the ERN also were
larger in the high OCS group. These findings indicate that high OCS are associated with enhanced performance monitoring in a
social responsibility context, when mistakes harm others instead of the self, and demonstrate the importance of integrating the
social context in performance monitoring research as a way to shed more light on obsessive-compulsive symptomatology.
Keywords Error-relatednegativity .Event-relatedpotential . Social performancemonitoring .Obsessive-compulsive symptoms .
Responsibility
To detect our mistakes and learn from them, we need to mon-
itor our performance continuously. As such, performance
monitoring helps us to behave in a safe, flexible, and adaptive
way. However, our behavior often takes place in a social con-
text, and hence our mistakes may not only affect ourselves but
also the people around us. Mistakes made in a social context
therefore often are linked to increased feelings of responsibil-
ity and guilt. This is especially the case for individuals who
score high on obsessive-compulsive symptoms (OCS).
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a prevalent and
highly debilitating disorder characterized by obsessions, i.e.,
intrusive and unwanted thoughts, and compulsions, which are
repetitive ritualistic behaviors or mental acts that individuals
feel driven to perform (American Psychiatric Association,
2013). The disorder has a considerable social component, be-
cause individuals with OCD often are characterized by an
inflated sense of responsibility together with a fear of making
mistakes that may harm others (Hezel & McNally, 2016). For
example, people with OCD may repeatedly check light
switches, electronic devices, (gas) taps, and locks tomake sure
that family members are protected from accidents, such as fire
or burglaries. In other instances, they may repeatedly check
their car for damage tomake sure that they did not accidentally
hit someone while driving. Other patients may engage in rit-
uals, such as counting to a certain number to neutralize the fear
that something bad will happen to a loved one if a ritual is not
performed. This inflated sense of responsibility and fear of
causing harm also is observed in nonclinical samples scoring
high on OCS (Gibbs, 1996). Yet, previous studies investigat-
ing obsessive-compulsive symptomatology have been limited
to performance monitoring processes in an individual, i.e.,
nonsocial context. The current electroencephalography
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(EEG) study was designed to explore the role of individual
differences in OCS in social performance monitoring with a
focus on the role of responsibility for other’s harm.
OCDwas the first disorder to be investigated in the context
of (nonsocial) performance monitoring (Gehring, Himle, &
Nisenson, 2000). More than 30 years ago, Pitman (1987) al-
ready suggested that compulsions in OCD result from persis-
tent high error signals that cannot be eliminated by behavioral
actions. It was only after the discovery of an event-related
potential (ERP) component related to error detection
(Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1990;
Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993) that his mod-
el could be formally tested. This component, the so-called
error-related negativity (ERN), is usually elicited in speeded-
choice reaction time paradigms, such as the Flanker task
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), and is characterized by a negative
frontocentral deflection, which occurs immediately after an
incorrect response and reaches its peak 50-100 ms later
(Gehring et al., 1993). The ERN has been suggested to result
from dopamine-driven prediction errors generated in the ante-
rior midcingulate cortex (aMCC) or the posterior medial fron-
tal cortex (pMFC) more broadly and is thought to trigger
subsequent behavioral adjustments and learning (for a
theoretical overview see Ullsperger, Danielmeier & Jocham,
2014a). The ERN is accompanied by a later positive compo-
nent known as the error positivity (Pe). The Pe often is divided
in an early and a more centroparietal-oriented late or classical
component and is thought to be involved in the conscious
affective processing of errors (Ullsperger, Fischer, Nigbur, &
Endrass, 2014b). Research on nonsocial performance moni-
toring has repeatedly demonstrated increased ERN amplitudes
in both OCD patients and nonclinical samples scoring high on
OCS (see Riesel, 2019 for a recent review and meta-analysis),
whereas alterations of the Pe are generally not observed (see
Endrass & Ullsperger, 2014).
It has long been recognized that motivational or affective
factors and individual differences can modulate ERN ampli-
tudes (Proudfit, Inzlicht, & Mennin, 2013) and performance
monitoring more generally (Koban & Pourtois, 2014). For
example, Pailing and Segalowitz (2004) demonstrated that
higher monetary incentives led to higher ERNs, but this am-
plitude difference was smaller or absent for individuals high in
conscientiousness and low in neuroticism. Similarly, Riesel,
Weinberg, Endrass, Kathmann, and Hajcak (2012) showed
enhanced ERNs when errors were punished, with larger ef-
fects for those with higher trait anxiety. Importantly, however,
most studies have been limited to an individual context. Yet,
as social beings, humans are continuously in interaction with
others. This means that in order to behave in a flexible and
adaptive way, we do not only need to take our own but also
other people’s actions and the consequences of our own ac-
tions for others into account when monitoring our perfor-
mance (de Bruijn, de Lange, von Cramon, & Ullsperger,
2009). Recent research therefore has ventured into the domain
of social performance monitoring to provide a more integra-
tive account of performance monitoring. For example, func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging research using the so-
called Cannonball task has demonstrated that performing
while being responsible for the outcomes of a co-actor result-
ed in activation within the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex
(dMPFC) (Radke, de Lange, Ullsperger, & de Bruijn, 2011).
This area is part of the “mentalizing” network, a network
involved in sharing or inferring other’s states (Van
Overwalle, 2011), suggesting that participants were concerned
with how their performance affected others. Other labs have
shown, for example, increased ERNs for errors made while
being evaluated by another person (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, &
Simons, 2005) and increased activation of the pMFC and the
insular cortex, a brain area associated with the conscious or
affective processing of errors, for mistakes that resulted in
harm to a friend compared to non-harmful mistakes (Koban
et al., 2013). A recent EEG study from our lab additionally
showed enhanced ERNs following mistakes that negatively
affected a co-actor, but only after administration of the neuro-
peptide oxytocin (de Bruijn, Ruissen, & Radke, 2017).
Oxytocin has been theorized to play an important role in social
motivation and salience attribution to social cues (Ma,
Shamay-Tsoory, Han & Zink, 2016), suggesting that this com-
pound may have worked to enhance perceived responsibility
in the social context. In addition, we recently demonstrated
enhanced ERNs for mistakes that had harmful (hearing a loud
aversive sound) versus nonharmful (hearing a soft
nonaversive sound) consequences for a co-actor (De Bruijn,
Jansen & Overgaauw, 2020). These studies suggest that
heightened feelings of responsibility and affective distress as-
sociated with social mistakes may result in increased perfor-
mance monitoring and may induce additional social cognitive
processes. Additionally, individual differences in responsibil-
ity and concern for other’s harm may moderate these
processes.
According to the cognitive theory of OCD, inflated per-
ceived responsibility for harm plays a crucial role in the onset
of the disorder as patients misinterpret intrusive thoughts as
indicating that they are responsible for preventing harm com-
ing to others or oneself and that actions (e.g., compulsions) are
needed to prevent feared events from happening (Salkovskis,
1985). It is believed that fear of harm coming to others is a
relatively unique feature of OCD, with other anxiety-related
disorders (e.g., health anxiety and agoraphobia) better charac-
terized by a fear of harm coming to oneself (Rachman, 2002).
The current study therefore takes a first step in examining the
role of these social symptoms by investigating how low versus
high OCS in a healthy sample are associated with electrophys-
iological indices of performance monitoring during a Flanker
task in different responsibility contexts, i.e., situations where
mistakes have negative consequences for 1) oneself
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(responsibility for self), 2) someone else (responsibility for
other), or 3) no one (no responsibility). We expected that in-
dividuals with high OCS would display overall increased
ERN amplitudes compared with individuals scoring low on
these symptoms. In addition, we expected that, relative to
individuals with low OCS, those with high OCS would expe-
rience mistakes that negatively affect others as more aversive
compared with mistakes that affect own outcome and would
therefore display particularly increased ERNs for social mis-
takes, i.e., when responsible for someone else’s outcome.
Method
Participants
Participants were preselected based on self-reported OCS in
an online survey study of more than 1,200 participants adver-
tised on the Leiden University Research Participation System
(SONA). Individuals scoring low (≤9) or high (≥21) on the
revised version of the Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory
(OCI-R) were invited to take part in the study, based on the
suggestion that using a cutoff score of 21 provides the optimal
balance between sensitivity and specificity in separating OCD
patients from controls (Foa et al. 2002). A total of 56 healthy
volunteers between ages 18 and 35 years participated in the
experiment. One participant was excluded due to an insuffi-
cient number of errors (<6) made in the task, in accordance
with the indications by Olvet and Hajcak (2009) that a mini-
mum of 6 trials are needed to obtain reliable ERNs. Two
participants were excluded for having made too many errors
(>45%) and two other participants were excluded due to poor
data quality, leaving a total of 51 participants for analysis.
Table 1 displays the characteristics for each group. Users of
antidepressants or comparable medication and individuals
with a psychiatric diagnosis were excluded from the study.
Participants completed the experiment for course credits or
monetary compensation and provided written informed con-
sent. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the
Institute of Psychology (Leiden University) and was conduct-
ed in accordance with the latest version of the declaration of
Helsinki.
Experimental procedure and task
Two participants were invited to the lab. One of these partic-
ipants was preselected based on OCS and underwent EEG
recordings. This part icipant performed the Error
Responsibility task (ERT), a modified version of the Flanker
task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) (Figure 1). The goal of this
task is to respond with the left or right index finger according
to the direction of the middle arrow in a string of five arrows.
Half of the trials presented congruent stimuli, i.e., the middle
arrow points in the same direction as the surrounding arrows
(i.e., <<<<< or >>>>>), and the other half presented incon-
gruent stimuli (i.e., <<><< or >><>>). To ensure that partic-
ipants made enough mistakes, the task was programmed so
that the fixation cross between each trial turned red when less
than two errors were detected in the preceding 12 trials.
Participants were told that this red cross served as a time
warning, indicating that they were responding too slowly
and emphasizing the need to speed up. The experimental trials
were presented in E-prime (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.,
Pittsburgh, PA). Each trial started with a fixation cross (450
ms, but 1,000 ms when a red cross was presented), followed
by a blank screen (250 ms). The target arrows were presented
for 100 ms. Then, a blank screen was presented again for
900 ms during which the participants had time to respond.
After this, a blank screen was shown again for 50 ms.
Participants started with two individual practice blocks.
Following this practice condition the other participant, i.e.,
the confederate, came in. The confederate was introduced to
the participant and seated behind the computer next to him or
her. The confederate was instructed to observe the partici-
pant’s performance by counting the number of mistakes made
by the participant as well as the number of presented time
warnings. To this end, the confederate’s computer screen
was mirrored to that of the participant. The confederate could
count the mistakes based on a thumbs up or thumbs down sign
presented in the top left corner of the screen for each trial,
which was not visible on the EEG participant’s screen.
Subsequently, the task was performed in three different re-
sponsibi l i ty condi t ions, the order of which was
counterbalanced across participants. Mistakes of the “respon-
sible player” either 1) did not affect any monetary bonus, 2)
affected only their own bonus, or 3) affected only the confed-
erate’s bonus. Crucially, only the preselected participant was
responsible for the bonuses and performed the task. In the two
responsibility conditions, 20 eurocents was subtracted from
either the participant’s or confederate’s bonus from an initial
bonus of 10 euros for every mistake and every time warning.
Each condition consisted of two blocks of 120 trials,
resulting in a total amount of 960 trials. The task lasted ap-
proximately 45 minutes, including short breaks. After each
condition, participants were asked to indicate on visual analog
scales from 0 to 100 to what extent they 1) felt angry, 2) felt
frustrated, 3) disliked making mistakes, 4) felt responsible for
their mistakes, and 5) were afraid to make mistakes.
Measures
All participants completed the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002). This
is an 18-item self-report measure assessing symptoms of OCD
compromised of 6 subscales: washing, checking, ordering,
obsessing, hoarding, and neutralizing. Each question is an-
swered on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). The
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questionnaire has excellent psychometric properties, demon-
strated both in patients (Foa et al., 2002) and in a nonclinical
college sample (Hajcak, Huppert, Simons & Foa, 2004). To
measure general beliefs about responsibility for harm, partic-
ipants completed the Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS;
Salkovskis et al., 2000). This 26-item questionnaire is rated
on a 7-point scale ranging from totally agree (1) to totally
disagree (7), with higher scores indicating lower perceived
responsibility. The RAS has been reported to have high reli-
ability and internal consistency (Salkovskis et al.). From the
original RAS, we additionally took the eight most suited items
and rephrased these to create a “self” and “other” version to
dissociate between responsibility for harm coming to oneself
versus others. For example, in the “self” version, the original
item “I often feel responsible for things which go wrong” was
rephrased as “I often feel responsible for things which go
wrong for myself.” In the “other” version, this was rephrased
as “I often feel responsible for things which go wrong for
others.” This resulted in two separate, eight-item question-
naires. Participants also completed the State Trait Anxiety
Table 1. Group characteristics of individuals scoring low and high on OCS (means and SDs)
Low OCS (N = 27) High OCS (N = 24) p value
Age 20.44 (2.28) 20.42 (2.90) 0.970
Gender (M/F) 4/23 1/23 0.202
Handedness (L/R) 0/27 1/26 0.284
OCI-R Washing .15 (.46) 2.9 (2.43) <0.001
Checking .74 (1.06) 4.58 (2.65) <0.001
Ordering .22 (.42) 5.96 (2.68) <0.001
Obsessing .89 (1.40) 6.13 (3.17) <0.001
Hoarding 1.85 (1.35) 6.42 (2.08) <0.001
Neutralizing .11 (.32) 2.71 (1.88) <0.001
Total 3.96 (2.39) 28.71 (1.88) <0.001
BDI-II 5.37 (4.67) 12.50 (7.06) <0.001
STAI-T 32.74 (8.42) 45.92 (9.12) <0.001
RAS Total 114.69 (20.68) 94.93 (19.46) 0.001
Self 31.04 (8.05) 26.13 (7.90) 0.033
Other 34.63 (8.83) 29.33 (9.14) 0.041
OCS =Obsessive-compulsive symptoms; OCI-R =Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory –Revised; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II; STAI-T = State
Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait; RAS = Responsibility Attitude Scale
Fig. 1 Experimental setup of the Error Responsibility Task. The left participant performed a Flanker task in three different responsibility conditions while
EEG was recorded. Meanwhile, the participant on the right counted their mistakes and the number of time warnings
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Inventory–Trait (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) and
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, &
Brown, 1996) to assess symptoms of anxiety and depression
respectively.
Electrophysiological recordings and pre-processing
EEG was recorded using an elastic cap with 31 electrodes
(midline: Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, Oz; lateral: AF3-4, FC1-2, FC5-6,
F3-4, F7-8, T7-8, C3-4, CP1-2, CP5-6, P3-4, P7-8, PO3-4,
O1-2) according to an extended version of the 10-20 system.
Vertical and horizontal eye electro-oculograms (EOGs) were
recorded from electrodes above and below the right eye and at
the outer canthi of the eyes, respectively. Data were acquired
with a sampling rate of 512 Hz. Electrodes were referenced to
common mode sense (CMS) during data acquisition, and af-
terwards re-referenced to the average of both mastoids. Data
were further processed and analyzed using Brain Vision
Analyzer (BVA) version 2 (Brain Products, Munich,
Germany). All channels were filtered using a high-pass filter
of 0.02 Hz and a time constant of 8 seconds. Subsequently, a
lowpass filter of 20 Hz (order 8) and a notch filter of 50 Hz
was applied on all channels except the EOG. Before ocular
correction, a lenient artifact rejection was performed on all
electrode channels using the following settings: maximum
allowed voltage step: 50 Hz, maximum allowed amplitude
difference: 300μVin 200-ms interval, minimal and maximum
allowed amplitude: −250 and 250 μV, lowest allowed activity
in interval: 0.5 μV in 100 ms interval. Subsequently, eye
movements were corrected using the automatic independent
component analysis (ICA) for ocular correction as provided in
BVA and checked afterwards. If for individual cases the auto-
matic ocular ICA correction proved unsatisfactory (e.g., if
stimulus-locked cardiac activity was observed), the semiauto-
matic procedure was performed to remove EOG and cardiac
artifacts. After the ocular correction, a stricter artifact rejection
was applied by using the following settings: maximum
allowed voltage step: 50 Hz, maximum allowed amplitude
difference: 100μVin 200-ms interval, minimal and maximum
allowed amplitude: −75 μV and 75 μV. Response-locked
ERPs were averaged separately based on condition and cor-
rectness and time-locked to response onset, from 200 ms be-
fore to 600 ms after the response. These ERPs were subse-
quently baseline corrected relative to a pre-response duration
of 200 ms.
The ERN was determined for correct and incorrect trials
separately and quantified as peak-to-peak amplitude at elec-
trode Fz, FCz, and Cz by subtracting the most positive peak in
the −80 to 80 ms time window from the most negative peak in
the 0 to 150 ms time window (de Bruijn et al., 2017, 2020).
For the Pe, we focused on the “late” component, which was
defined as the mean amplitude in the 300-500 ms after the
response for electrodes Fz, FCz, Cz, and Pz in line with pre-
vious research (de Bruijn et al., 2017; de Bruijn et al., 2020).
In line with previous studies (Endrass, Riesel, Kathmann,
& Buhlmann, 2014; Riesel, Goldhahn, & Kathmann, 2017a;
Riesel et al., 2019b), peak amplitudes were determined with a
time interval of 20 ms surrounding each peak in order to
reduce the influence of background EEG noise (Clayson,
Baldwin, & Larson, 2013).
Statistical analyses
First, all trials with too fast (<100 ms), too slow (>800 ms), or
no responses were removed from the dataset (1.2% of all
trials). The presence of standard behavioral Flanker effects
was investigated using repeated measures ANOVAs. The first
analysis included the within-subject factors congruency (con-
gruent vs. incongruent), condition (no-responsibility, respon-
sibility-for-self, responsibility-for-other) and the between-
subject factor OCS (low vs. high) for reaction times to correct
responses only. The same factors were used to investigate the
error rates. To investigate differences between erroneous and
correct trials, reaction times were analyzed using the within-
subject factors correctness (correct vs. incorrect) and condi-
tion and the between-subject factor OCS. Because erroneous
responses to congruent trials are rare, this analysis was per-
formed on incongruent trials only.
For the ERP analyses, ERN and Pe amplitudes were first
analyzed for incongruent trials only using correctness, condi-
tion and electrode (ERN: Fz, FCz, Cz; Pe: Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz) as
within-subject factors and OCS as between-subject factor to
investigate the effect of correctness. Subsequently, we re-
moved the factor correctness to investigate error trials only.
In case of sphericity violation, Greenhouse-Geisser correc-
tions were applied. Lastly, visual analog scales with self-
reported states were analyzed using repeated measures




Table 2 displays the mean reaction times. The analysis on
correct responses only showed the expected effect of congru-
ency, F(1,49) = 774.38, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.94, with slower
reaction times for incongruent (314 ms) compared with con-
gruent trials (234 ms). No other significant main or interaction
effects were observed (Fs < 1.84, ps > 0.165). The analysis on
incongruent trials only showed the expected effect of correct-
ness, F(1,49) = 984.44, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.95. The interaction
between condition and correctness did not reach significance,
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p = 0.091. No other significant effects were observed (Fs <
2.07, ps > 0.132).
Table 3 shows the error rates across the different conditions
and OCS groups. The error-rate analysis showed the expected
effect of congruency, F(1,49) = 415.18, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.89,
with more errors for incongruent trials (21.4%) compared with
congruent ones (1.8%). There also was a main effect of condi-
tion, F(1,98) = 4.89, p = 0.009, ηp
2 = 0.091. Participants made
significantly more mistakes in the no-responsibility condition
(12.2%) comparedwith the condition inwhich theywere respon-
sible for the bonus of the other participant (11.0%, p = 0.002).
The between-subjects effect of obsessive-compulsive group did
not reach significance, p = 0.10. No interaction effects were
observed (Fs < 1.52, ps > 0.224). Note that the analyses on
post-error slowing did not show any effects of OCS or condition
either (see Supplemental Results).
Error-related negativity
Grand averages of the response-locked waveforms for correct
and incorrect trials are displayed in Figure 2 for the low
obsessive-compulsive group and Figure 3 for the high
obsessive-compulsive group. We first assessed whether the
expected main effect of correctness was present using all three
(correctness, condition, electrode) within-subject factors.
Analysis indeed showed this effect, F(1,49) = 132.71, p <
0.001, ηp
2 = 0.730, with larger amplitudes for errors (−11.6
μV) compared with correct trials (−3.3 μV). Next, to reduce
the complexity of the model and to investigate the error-
specificity of possible effects, we removed the factor correct-
ness and focused on error and correct trials separately.
Analyses of error trials only showed a main effect of elec-
trode, F(2,98) = 21.00, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.300. Amplitudes
were largest at FCz (−12.9 μV), followed by Cz (−11.6 μV)
and then Fz (−10.4 μV), all ps < 0.019, reflecting the
frontocentral topography of the ERN (see also Figures 2B
and 3B). No main effects of condition or OCS were found
(Fs < 1.27, ps > 0.285). Neither the interaction between elec-
trode and condition (p = 0.141), nor the interaction between
condition and OCS (p = 0.091) reached significance. There
was no significant interaction between OCS and electrode
either, p = 0.941. However, a significant three-way interaction
was observed between electrode, condition, and OCS,
F(4,196) = 3.63, p = 0.019, ηp
2 = 0.069.
Pairwise comparisons focusing on electrode FCz—where
error-related negativity (ERN) amplitudes were maximal—
showed that participants high in OCS had higher ERN ampli-
tudes in the condition in which they were responsible for the
other’s bonus (−14.8 μV) compared with their own bonus
(−12.8 μV), p = 0.042. This effect was not found for individ-
uals low in OCS (p > 0.435). No significant differences with
the no-responsibility condition were found (ps > 0.145).
Exploratory analyses in the low-scoring group showed a
marginally significant effect when comparing the condition in
which they were responsible for their own bonus compared
with when they were not responsible for any bonus at elec-
trode FCz (p = 0.063). This effect reached significance at
electrode Cz, −11.7 μV vs. −9.8 μV, p = 0.034, indicating that
Table 2. Mean reaction times in milliseconds for the obsessive-compulsive groups across the different conditions (means and SDs)
Low OCS (N = 27) High OCS (N = 24)
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Correct Correct Error Correct Correct Error
No responsibility 236 (29) 321 (39) 221 (27) 233 (32) 312 (50) 222 (41)
Responsible for self 238 (28) 318 (41) 230 (31) 229 (30) 306 (44) 216 (33)
Responsible for other 238 (28) 319 (36) 222 (26) 230 (28) 309 (45) 218 (37)
OCS = Obsessive-compulsive symptoms
Table 3. Error rates (%) for the obsessive-compulsive groups across the different conditions (means and SDs)
Low OCS (N = 27) High OCS (N = 24)
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
No responsibility 1.9 (1.8) 20.8 (7.2) 2.4 (2.6) 23.8 (8.3)
Responsible for self 1.2 (1.0) 19.7 (7.9) 2.3 (1.8) 22.8 (8.9)
Responsible for other 1.2 (1.6) 19.1 (6.7) 1.7 (1.6) 22.0 (7.6)
OCS = Obsessive-compulsive symptoms
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the significant three-way interaction was primarily driven by
the two groups displaying different effects of the conditions at
these two electrodes.
Analyses of correct trials only showed the expected main
effect of electrode, F(2, 98) = 9.30, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.160.
Amplitudes were significantly larger at FCz (−3.6 μV) and Cz
(−3.5 μV) compared with Fz (−2.8 μV), ps < 0.014, but the
difference between FCz and Cz was not significant, p = 0.372.
Importantly, however, no other significant effects were observed
(Fs < 1.36, ps > 0.261). Table 4 displays the peak amplitudes of
the ERN and CRN for the obsessive-compulsive groups across
the responsibility conditions at each electrode location.
Error positivity
Analysis of the late error positivity (Pe) showed the expected
effect of correctness, F(1,49) = 73.52, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.600,
with more positive amplitudes for incorrect (4.2 μV) com-
pared with correct trials (−2.2 μV). Next, the factor correct-
ness was removed to reduce the complexity of the model and
to investigate the error-specificity of possible effects.
Analysis of error trials separately showed the expected effect
of electrode, F(3,147) = 11.77, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.194. The error
positivity was most positive at Pz (5.6 μV), followed by Cz (4.8
μV), FCz (3.6 μV), and Fz (3.0 μV), with only the difference
between Pz and Cz not reaching significance (p = 0.062). A
significant main effect of OCS also was observed, F(1,49) =
8.84, p = 0.005, ηp
2 = 0.153, showing more positive amplitudes
in the high (6.1μV) comparedwith the lowOCSgroup (2.3μV).
No other significant effects were present (Fs < 2.00, ps > 0.115).
Analyses of correct trials only showed the expected main
effect of electrode, F(3, 147) = 24.80, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.336,
showing that amplitudes weremost negative at Pz (−7.4μV) and
FCz (−7.1 μV) compared with Cz (−5.2 μV) and Fz (−2.5 μV),
Fz FCz
Cz Pz
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Low OCS (N = 27)a
-9.85 µV 1.21 µV
66 ms
No responsibility
-11.951 µV 0.078 µV
64 ms
Responsible for self
-11.46 µV 0.43 µV
68 ms
Responsible for other
-1.71 µV 0.30 µV
90 ms
Responsible for self 
minus no one
b
Fig. 2 A) Response-locked event-related potential waveforms averages
for correct and incorrect trials in every condition for the low obsessive-
compulsive group at electrode Fz, FCz, Cz, and Pz. A 15-Hz low-pass
filter and a −50 to 0 ms baseline correction were applied to the grand
averages for visual representation. B) Topographical maps of the ERN in
the low obsessive-compulsive group at peak onset for each condition as
well as for the difference between the responsibility for self and no one
condition. OCS = obsessive-compulsive symptoms; ERN = error-related
negativity; Pe = error positivity
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ps < 0.002, whereas the difference between Pz and FCz was not
significant, p = 0.561. The between-group effect of OCSwas not
significant (p = 0.339), and no other effects were found, Fs <
1.05, ps > 0.372.
Self-reported states
Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 5.
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Fig. 3. A) Response-locked event-related potential waveforms averages
for correct and incorrect trials in each condition for the high obsessive-
compulsive group at electrode Fz, FCz, Cz, and Pz. A 15-Hz low-pass
filter and a −50 to 0 ms baseline correction were applied to the grand
averages for visual representation. B) Topographical maps of the ERN in
the high obsessive-compulsive group at peak onset for each condition as
well as for the difference between the responsibility for other and self
condition. OCS = obsessive-compulsive symptoms; ERN = error-related
negativity; Pe = error positivity
Table 4. Peak amplitudes (μV) of the correct- and error-related negativity for the obsessive-compulsive groups across the responsibility conditions at
the different electrode locations (means and SDs)
Low OCS (N = 27) High OCS (N = 24)
Fz FCz Cz Fz FCz Cz
CRN No responsibility -2.9 (3.3) -3.8 (3.7) -3.8 (3.3) -2.3 (2.5) -3.1 (3.3) -3.0 (2.9)
Responsibility for self -3.3 (3.6) -4.2 (3.9) -3.9 (3.6) -2.2 (2.1) -2.9 (2.6) -2.7 (1.8)
Responsibility for other -2.9 (3.6) -4.1 (3.8) -4.0 (3.7) -3.0 (2.6) -3.7 (3.1) -3.5 (2.9)
ERN No responsibility -9.5 (5.5) -11.3 (7.0) -9.8 (6.6) -10.9 (6.3) -13.5 (7.5) -12.4 (7.4)
Responsibility for self -10.1 (5.8) -13.0 (6.5) -11.7 (6.8) -10.4 (5.7) -12.8 (6.6) -11.5 (5.9)
Responsibility for other -9.4 (4.4) -12.3 (5.7) -11.4 (5.9) -11.9 (6.3) -14.8 (7.5) -13.1 (7.0)
OCS = Obsessive-compulsive symptoms; CRN = correct-related negativity ; ERN = error-related negativity
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the question, “I felt responsible for my mistakes,” F(2,98)
= 13.85, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.220, showing that people felt
most responsible when they were playing for the other’s
bonus compared with when they were playing for their
own bonus and when they were not playing for a bonus,
ps < 0.015. There also was a main effect of OCS, F(1,49)
= 8.32, p = 0.006, ηp
2 = 0.145, showing that participants
high in OCS generally felt more responsible for their er-
rors than those low in these symptoms. No interaction
between condition and OCS was found (F < 1).
Participants high inOCS also felt significantlymore afraid to
make mistakes compared with those low in these symptoms,
F(1,49) = 4.85, p = 0.032, ηp
2 = 0.090. A main effect of con-
dition also was found for this item, F(2,48) = 17.16, p < 0.001,
ηp
2 = 0.417, showing that participants were more afraid when
they mademistakes in the condition in which they were respon-
sible for the other’s bonus compared with when they played for
their own bonus and compared to the no-responsibility condi-
tion, ps < 0.001. The difference between the responsibility-for-
self and no-responsibility condition did not reach significance
(p = 0.119). Importantly, an interaction of condition with OCS
also was observed, F(2,48) = 4.71, p = 0.014, ηp
2 = 0.417. This
interaction showed that those scoring high on OCS were sig-
nificantly more afraid to make mistakes when they were re-
sponsible for the other’s bonus compared with when they were
responsible for their own bonus and compared with the no-
responsibility condition, ps < 0.001, whereas the difference
between the no-responsibility and responsibility-for-self condi-
tion was not significant (p = 0.767). For those scoring low on
OCS, however, the difference between the responsibility-for-
self and responsibility-for-other condition was not significant
(p = 0.269). Participants did report to feel more afraid when
they were responsible for the other’s bonus compared with the
no-responsibility condition, p = 0.006, and scores also were
marginally higher for the responsibility-for-self condition com-
pared with the no-responsibility condition (p = 0.052).
Individuals high in OCS also reported on average to dislike
making mistakes to a greater extent than those low in these
symptoms, F(1,49) = 9.37, p = 0.004, ηp
2 = 0.160. A main
effect of condition (F(2,98) = 21.49, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.305)
indicated that participants disliked making mistakes most in the
condition in which they were responsible for the other’s bonus,
followed by the responsibility-for-self condition and the no-
responsibility condition (all comparisons ps < 0.003). Here,
no interaction of group and condition was observed (F < 1).
For anger and frustration, only main effects of con-
dition were found, F(2,98) = 3.13, p = 0.049, ηp
2 =
0.060 and F(2,98) = 5.31, p = 0.006, ηp
2 = 0.098,
respectively. Both anger and frustration were significant-
ly higher in the responsibility-for-other compared with
the no-responsibility condition, ps = 0.020, whereas oth-
er comparisons did not reach significance (ps > 0.080).
No effect of group or an interaction with group was
found for anger or frustration (Fs < 1).
Correlations between ERN and self-report measures
To explore to what extent self-reported increases in negative
emotions (fear of and dislike ofmistakes) in the responsibility-
for-other compared with the responsibility-for-self condition
were related to changes in ERN amplitudes, we calculated
differences scores for these variables. Across all participants,
the ΔERN (responsibility-for-other minus responsibility-for-
self at FCz) showed a significant negative correlation with
the difference in fear of making mistakes between these con-
ditions (r = −0.362, p = 0.009), as well as with the difference
in disliking mistakes between these conditions (r = −0.346, p
= 0.013). However, the latter correlation with disliking mis-
takes was largely driven by an outlier. When removing this
outlier, effects became non-significant (r = −0.237, p = 0.098).
Figure 4 displays the correlation between the difference in fear
of making mistakes and disliking mistakes across these two
conditions in relation to the change in ERN. Note that the
ERN is a negative ERP component, which means that the
negative correlations indicate that relatively larger ERNs in
the other versus the self condition are associated with relative-
ly higher fear and dislike of mistakes.
Table 5. Self-reported visual analog scores for every condition across the obsessive-compulsive groups (means and SDs)













Anger 26.7 (21.4) 32.4 (23.3) 32.3 (25.5) 21.0 (23.0) 25.9 (26.3) 28.4 (21.8)
Frustration 41.5 (23.1) 48.2 (26.1) 52.3 (24.2) 47.2 (31.9) 50.8 (33.3) 57.33 (28.3)
“I felt responsible for my
mistakes”
48.6 (26.1) 57.5 (25.6) 60.6 (23.5) 64.3 (24.7) 72.1 (22.5) 81.2 (19.7)
“I was afraid to make mistakes” 35.0 (23.2) 42.9 (26.9) 46.5 (26.4) 49.9 (27.4) 51.1 (30.0) 69.4 (30.0)
“I disliked making mistakes” 37.2 (27.6) 49.0 (27.2) 55.5 (22.0) 57.5 (28.1) 63.7 (23.0) 77.4 (21.7)
OCS = Obsessive-compulsive symptoms
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Discussion
The current study was designed to investigate the role of in-
dividual differences in OCS in the electrophysiological corre-
lates of performance monitoring in different social responsi-
bility contexts. Behaviorally, the expected standard Flanker
effects were present. Importantly, no differences in perfor-
mance were detected between the low and high obsessive-
compulsive groups. Furthermore, ERP analyses showed that
participants high in OCS displayed enhanced ERN amplitudes
when they were responsible for the other’s bonus compared
with their own bonus. Participants low inOCS instead showed
enhanced ERN amplitudes when they were responsible for
their own bonus compared with when they were not respon-
sible for any bonus. No between-group differences in ERN
amplitudes were found. Finally, participants high in OCS
showed larger (i.e., more positive) amplitudes of the late Pe
compared with those low in OCS, independent of condition.
On the behavioral level, results are in line with the majority
of past performance monitoring research showing an absence
of differences in task performance relating to obsessive-
compulsive symptomatology or contextual manipulations in
the presence of differences on the electrophysiological level
(for an overview, see Endrass & Ullsperger, 2014). Behavioral
performance did not differ as a function of condition either,
with the exception of overall error rates being slightly higher
in the no responsibility compared with the responsibility for
other condition, something that is likely attributed to the ab-
sence of negative (monetary) consequences of making errors
in this condition. Because previous research has indicated that
differences in performance can affect ERN amplitudes
(Fischer, Klein & Ullsperger, 2017), the overall absence of
these differences importantly prevents confounding of the
electrophysiological results.
ERP results showed that ERN amplitudes importantly dif-
fered as a function of OCS across the responsibility contexts.
Specifically, participants high in OCS showed enhanced am-
plitudes of the ERN when they were responsible for the
other’s compared with their own bonus. In line with our hy-
potheses, this finding indicates that high OCS individuals
show enhanced monitoring of performance in a social respon-
sibility context, whenmistakes negatively affect others instead
of the self. Monitoring activity of participants low in OCS,
however, did not differ between the condition in which they
were responsible for their own bonus compared with someone
else’s bonus, indicating that these individuals did not differ-
entiate as much between the two situations. Although not a
priori hypothesized, exploratory analyses showed that they
did experience a drop in ERN amplitudes in the no-
responsibility condition compared with the condition in which
they were responsible for their own bonus. This is in accor-
dance with previous research showing that healthy individuals
(i.e., individuals scoring low on OCS) are able to downregu-
late effectively their monitoring activity when less monitoring
is needed (Endrass et al., 2010).
Contrary to most previous studies in patients and healthy
individuals with low and high OCS (for an overview, see
Riesel, 2019), no significant group differences in ERN ampli-
tudes were found. While this was in contrast to our initial
hypothesis, we believe that two contextual factors may ac-
count for this. In a previous study by Endrass et al. (2010),
OCD patients showed enhanced ERNs compared to healthy
controls in a standard Flanker task, whereas this difference
disappeared when errors were being punished. The authors
suggested that the patient group may have been unable to
downregulate monitoring activity in situations where less
monitoring is required, whereas the healthy controls showed
an appropriate upregulation of monitoring activity in the pun-
ishment condition. In our study, a monetary punishment was
also present, although not in all conditions, which might have
led to a similar upregulation. Perhaps more importantly, a
confederate was always present thus creating a strong social
context. This confederate observed the participant perform the
task while counting their mistakes and warnings, inducing an
evaluative social element in all conditions. Previous research
has indicated that being observed or evaluated by others can
lead to enhanced ERNs in healthy volunteers due to errors
being perceived as more significant (Hajcak et al., 2005;
Voegler et al., 2018). Together, this suggests that the overall
motivational and emotional significance of errors in our study
may have led to an upregulation of monitoring activity also in
the low scoring group, thereby concealing group differences
that might have been observed in situations where the need for
monitoring is lower.
Overall, participants reported to feel the highest levels of
responsibility, fear, and distress about making mistakes when
they were responsible for the other’s bonus. Interestingly, in-
creased fear of mistakes in the responsibility-for-other com-
























Fear of making mistakes 
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Fig. 4 Scatterplot depicting the correlation between the change in ERN
amplitudes in μV at FCz between the responsibility for other and self
condition and the associated change in fear of making mistakes
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associated with a relative increase in ERN amplitudes. This is
in agreement with a growing body of literature that indicates
that the ERN tracks the significance of errors (Proudfit et al.,
2013) and that affective and social influences are important
determinants of performance monitoring activity (Koban &
Pourtois, 2014). Importantly, both the ERN and its neural
generator, the aMCC, are known to be modulated by factors,
such as anxiety, negative affect, and empathic pain (Koban &
Pourtois; Shackman et al., 2011). As the social responsibility
context seems to have enhanced levels of fear of mistakes, this
presumably increased the need for cognitive or adaptive con-
trol, resulting in enhanced ERN amplitudes. The self-reported
scale “I felt responsible for my mistakes” however did not
correlate with the ERN. This suggests that the feelings of
anxiety resulting from being responsible for someone else’s
bonus are related to enhanced monitoring rather than the feel-
ing of responsibility itself. Nevertheless, the results indicate
that for individuals high in OCS, the social scenario of being
responsible for another’s outcome can importantly moderate
the magnitude of the ERN and that this is likely attributed to
the enhanced emotional significance resulting from this
responsibility.
Importantly, participants high in OCS compared with low
in OCS felt more responsible for their mistakes, more afraid to
make mistakes, and also disliked making mistakes more, in-
dependent of responsibility condition. Such a differential ap-
praisal of errors between those low and high in OCS has to our
knowledge never been directly demonstrated before and is in
line with the notion that obsessive-compulsive symptomatol-
ogy is associated with increased perceived responsibility
(Salkovskis et al., 2000). Note that the current findings also
are in line with a previous study by Stern et al. (2010), which
showed that OCD patients were significantly more frustrated
with their performance and more flustered when making mis-
takes. Participants with high OCS also reported higher trait
levels of perceived responsibility for harm as measured by
the RAS, both when it concerned harm coming to others and
harm coming to the self. Given the aforementioned evidence
that ERNs can be modulated by motivational and affective
factors, these results may indicate that previous findings of
increased ERNs in OCD patients can in part be attributed to
a heightened baseline appraisal of the motivational salience of
errors compared to healthy controls. In line with this, research
has shown that ERN amplitudes in OCD patients are similar to
those of healthy individuals under conditions where the moti-
vational salience of errors is increased, e.g., when errors are
being punished (Endrass et al., 2010) or when accuracy is
emphasized over speed (Riesel, Kathmann, & Klawohn,
2019a).
In line with the ERN results, participants high in OCS
reported higher fear of making mistakes when playing for
the other’s compared with their own bonus, whereas fear of
mistakes did not differ significantly between these two
conditions for individuals low in these symptoms. These re-
sults support the idea that individuals high in OCS are char-
acterized by increased levels of responsibility and a fear of
making mistakes that affect others (Hezel & McNally, 2016;
Salkovskis et al., 2000). Findings thus highlight the fact that
the fear of making mistakes that characterizes this group is not
limited to harm coming to the self but also is present and even
more pronounced when it concerns potential harm to others,
which is accompanied by increased monitoring activity as
indexed by the ERN. The current findings are particularly
important because nearly all previous investigations of perfor-
mance monitoring and obsessive-compulsive symptomatolo-
gy focused solely on the individual context, while ignoring the
fact that certain social circumstances may moderate and pos-
sibly aggravate overactive monitoring.
Unlike the ERN results, we did observe overall group dif-
ferences in the amplitude of the (late) Pe. Although the exact
functional significance of the Pe is still under debate, there is
evidence to suggest that this component is associated with the
conscious awareness or motivational significance of errors
(for a discussion, see Ullsperger et al., 2014a). From this per-
spective, the enhanced amplitudes observed in the high
obsessive-compulsive group seem consistent with the notion
that individuals high in OCS are generally more concerned
with their errors. In line with the generally higher levels of
fear of mistakes in participants with high OCS, previous stud-
ies have found a positive relation between the Pe and concern
over mistakes (Schrijvers et al., 2009) and have reported re-
duced Pe in disorder associated with blunted emotional re-
sponses, such as psychopathy (Brazil et al., 2009; Maurer
et al., 2016) and depression (Schrijvers et al., 2008). It is
possible that the social context of this study, where a confed-
erate observing the participant’s task performance was always
present, contributed to heightened emotional or motivational
salience and thus also increased error awareness of committed
errors in individuals with high OCS. Being observed by others
can lead to increased self-consciousness and feelings of shame
or embarrassment, especially for individuals who are already
characterized by high levels of responsibility, perfectionism,
anxiety, and worry and who are more focused on preventing
harm (Hezel &McNally, 2016). Most previous studies did not
observe any differences in Pe amplitudes in relation to
obsessive-compulsive symptomatology (Endrass et al., 2008,
2010; Xiao et al., 2011), and the vast majority of OCS-related
studies simply do not analyze this component. Importantly,
however, these studies have been limited to nonsocial con-
texts, which highlights the need for replication of this finding.
Note that our stimulus-locked analyses (reported in detail
in Supplementary Materials) did not reveal any significant
(interaction) effects of condition and group for the N1 and
P300, supporting the response-locked error specificity of the
current findings. However, the analyses did show that the
stimulus-locked N2 component was modulated by condition
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as a function of obsessive-compulsive group. This component
is elicited in response to stimulus conflict and has been sug-
gested to be functionally equivalent to the response-locked
ERN, because the two components have a similar
frontocentral distribution and both indicate a need for adaptive
control (Ullsperger et al., 2014a). In line with this, the N2 was
recently found to be enhanced in patients with OCD (Riesel,
Klawohn, Kathmann & Endrass, 2017b), although previous
studies show mixed results (see Riesel et al. for a discussion).
In our study, participants with high OCS showed significantly
higher N2 amplitudes when they were responsible for the
other’s bonus, both compared to the responsibility-for-self
condition and compared with those low in OCS. This suggests
that, in accordance with the ERN findings, those high in OCS
showed particularly enhanced conflict monitoring when they
were responsible for the other’s bonus.
In summary, the current outcomes demonstrate that the
social context can importantly modulate performance
monitoring processes depending on an individual’s level
of OCS. Making errors in a social versus an individual
context, where errors affected others instead of the self,
resulted in enhanced early performance monitoring as
indexed by the ERN only in individuals high in OCS. In
line with the ERN results, only participants high in OCS
reported significantly higher fear of making mistakes
when playing for the other’s compared to their own bo-
nus, which underscores the notion that obsessive-
compulsive symptomatology is associated with increased
levels of concern for how actions might affect others.
Enhanced performance monitoring activity in the social
compared to individual context was also associated with
increased fear of making mistake, supporting existing lit-
erature that the subjective salience or distress associated
with making errors scales with the magnitude of the ERN.
Participants high in OCS also showed higher overall Pe
amplitudes, possibly as a result of increased salience and
awareness of committed errors under social observation,
as well as increased conflict processing as indexed by the
N2 specifically when they were responsible for the other’s
bonus.
The study has some limitations. First, the sample was
predominantly female, while there are indications that
gender differences in performance monitoring exist
(Fischer, Danielmeier, Villringer, Klein & Ullsperger,
2016). Second, it is unclear to what extent individuals
with subclinical obsessive-compulsive symptoms provide
a valid analogue for patients with OCD, because these
groups may differ on important characteristics. Our find-
ings therefore require replication in more gender-balanced
and psychiatric populations. Lastly, it should be recog-
nized that our (response-locked) results could be con-
founded by individual differences in the amplitude of
the stimulus-locked P300 (Meyer, Lerner, De Los Reyes,
Laird, & Hajcak, 2017). The employed response-proximal
baseline period (−200 to 0 ms) encompasses a large pos-
itive shift that is due to the generation of the P300 to the
stimulus, which occurs approximately 100 ms before a
response. Although no significant differences with regard
to the P300 were observed (see Supplementary
Materials), visual inspection of Figure S4 and S5 of the
supplements may suggest some slight variability in ampli-
tudes between our experimental conditions and groups,
with a slightly larger P300 for individuals high in OCS.
This may for example be due to increased attention in this
group (e.g., Polich, 2007). Increased amplitudes of the
P300 have previously been observed in patients with
OCD, which has been linked to overfocused attention,
although reduced amplitudes have been reported as well
(for a review see Perera, Bailey, Herring, & Fitzgerald,
2019). Although findings on P300 alterations in OCD
are somewhat mixed, it is possible that the P300—e.g.,
through altered attention allocation—contributed to both
the ERN and Pe results. Future research is thus needed to
determine to what extent experimental P300 alterations
may be responsible for ERN/Pe effects.
Conclusions
Our findings indicate that high OCS are associated with en-
hanced performance monitoring in a social responsibility con-
text, when mistakes harm others instead of the self. These
results provide an important stepping stone for future studies
in patient populations and stress the potential value of taking
the social context into account as a way to better understand
social symptoms and altered performance monitoring process-
es in OCD patients. Currently, the ERN is considered an
endophenotype of OCD (e.g., Riesel, 2019). Importantly, by
gaining more information about the (social) situations in
which alterations in the ERN are observed, we might increase
classification and risk predictions of and for the disorder and
might even discover ways to attenuate or reduce overactive
monitoring (Riesel, 2019). Because ERN enhancements are
not only observed in OCD, but also in other anxiety-related
disorders (see e.g., Meyer, 2016), the social context might
help to differentiate these disorders further. For example,
while the heightened fear of harming others that characterizes
OCD patients predicts enhanced monitoring of performance
in a social responsibility context, this might not be expected
for other anxiety disorders, such as health anxiety, where fear
of harm (i.e., catching a serious illness) is specifically directed
towards the self. To conclude, investigating social influences
on performance monitoring in different, but related clinical
populations may shed important new light on the symptom-
atology of not only OCD, but also other disorders character-
ized by altered responsibility attitudes.
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